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PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES AND THE ALTERNATIVE
PRACTICE OF LAW
CLARA ANN BOWLER
IN A PREVIOUS ARTICLE' the effects of the OEO national legal serv-
ices program on the public and the legal profession were examined.
It was found that the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program
had greatly increased the demand for the services of lawyers among
people who had hitherto handled their legal problems by themselves.
It magnified the volume and range of litigation with an explosion of
newly discovered "Rights," which in turn, -led to an explosion of
"Grievances." Three approaches to these developments were noted:
1) the development of new "people's" legal institutions, 2) return to
traditional uses of the legal process leaving social and economic prob-
lems to the political process and 3) expanding ,the scope of traditional
private legal services through new "delivery of services" mechanisms.2
The conclusion was that the proposed National Legal Service Corpora-
tion Act,' even if enacted, would not provide a workable solution to
either the rising demand for free or inexpensive lawyers' services or
the current Rights and Grievances explosion.
This article will examine some new developments in the private
and quasi-private (i.e., government subsized private) practice of law.
It will not discuss dispute resolving mechanisms on the fringes of the
practice of law such as arbitration, mediation and the ombudsman.
The analysis will be built around the three approaches to the legal
services problem outlined above. The "delivery of services" approach
will be dealt with first because it appears to have generated the great-
est volume of paper activity.
JUDICARE
Judicare is an alternative plan for government supported legal
services to the indigent. It is included in this survey of private "deliv-
ery of service" programs because it involves direct payment to private
1. Bowler, National Legal Services: The Answer or the Problem for the Legal
Profession, 50 CHi. KENT L. REV. 415 (1973).
2. Id. at 425-27.
3. H.R. 7824.
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legal practitioners on a case by case basis. American experiments un-
der the descriptive title "Judicare" are actually small scale adaptations
of the approach found in the British Legal Aid and Advice Act of
19494 which provided for payment on a reduced basis -to soliciters
and barristers who agreed to handle "legal aid" cases.' The distin-
guishing characteristics of existing Judicare plans are rigid financial
tests for eligibility, limitations on the type of cases handled and com-
pensation to participating attorneys at levels well -below the fees nor-
mally charged." The money saving theory behind Judicare programs
is that
attorneys will accept fees based on an hourly rate which is lower
than -the normal minimum. Because the legal matters of the poor
are additions to a regular practice, it is assumed -that overhead
costs should exert less of an impact on the total fee. 7
Although primarily committed to the neighborhood law office
model," OEO has funded two Judicare projects, one in rural Wisconsin
and Upper Michigan, and the other in Montana, which have remained
in operation since the mid-1960's.9 Researchers differ as to the effec-
tiveness and value of these programs.' 0 A larger California project
financed by a $2.5 million grant made as a compromise measure dur-
ing the California Rural Legal Assistance controversy" is still in the
developmental stage. However, in view of the British 24-year expe-
rience with Judicare, it is unlikely that these experiments will produce
any startling new approaches to the delivery of legal services to the
poor. The British, in fact revised their system in 1972 in order to
expand the range of financial eligibility and provide for the creation
4. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
5. Cole & Greenberger, Staff Attorneys v. Judicare: A Cost Analysis, 50 1. UR-
BAN LAw 705 (1973); Ginsburg, The Availability of Legal Services to Poor People and
People of Limited Means in Foreign Systems, 6 INT'L LAWYER 128 (1969); Zander,
English Legal Aid System at the Crossroads, 59 A.B.A.J. 368 (1973).
6. Wisconsin's Judicare program, for example, provides for compensation at 50 to
80% of the state bar association's suggested minimum fee. Brackel, Free Legal Serv-
ices for the Poor-Staffed Office versus Judicare: the Clients Evaluation, 1973 Wis.
LAw REv. 532, 533; Cole & Greenberger, supra note 5, at 709.
7. Cole & Greenberger, supra note 5, at 709.
8. Bowler, supra note I, at 416-19.
9. See Brackel, supra note 6; id., WlscoNsrN JtrDIcARE: A PRELIMINARY AP-
PRArSAL (American Bar Foundation, 1972); Cole & Greenberger, supra note 5.
10. Brackel, supra note 6; and supra note 8, based his research on personal inter-
views with clients and participating attorneys. He concludes that Judicare has served
its purpose reasonably well and has possibilities as an alternative to the neighborhood
legal services office. Cole & Greenberger, supra note 5, are skeptical about its future
because of its low rate of compensation to participating attorneys. The ABA has
dropped its support of Judicare because of its limited success in practice and the British
disillusionment with their program. See 60 A.B.A.J. 144, 152 (1974).
11. Bowler, supra note 1, at 421; Brackel, supra note 8, at 113.
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of "law and advice centres" staffed by salaried solicitors. 12  The "law
and advice centres" have yet to be implemented,' 8 but interest in the
American OEO neighborhood law office projects is increasing.14
Even more revealing is the introduction of a private "Legal Costs and
Expenses" insurance on the model of American pre-paid legal services
schemes in order to remedy "the injustice caused by the gap between
the income level for legal aid and the income level necessary for the
strain of costs to be borne in a civil action. 1' 5
Judicare has not captured much interest among the public in the
United States. Even Backel, its staunchest supporter, admits that the
attrition rate among experimental programs is higher than the number
of programs still in operation.'6 The new California proposal appears
to be a result of the political controversy over California Rural Legal
Assistance rather than a spontaneous movement for government spon-
sored Judicare. In the meantime Great Britain is in the process of
drastically remodelling its 24-year old program even to the extent of
supplementing it or replacing it with government salaried legal prac-
titioners based on the American OEO legal services model. Appar-
ently, Judicare is not the solution to the legal services dilemma either.
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES: THE THEORY
Prepaid legal services is a system of insurance against the cost
of lawyer services based on the model of standard American health and
hospitalization insurance plans. The subject matter of the insurance
is lawyer's fees (and possibly court costs) as opposed to damages aris-
ing from adverse judgments. It had its origins in the American Bar
12. See Samuels, Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1972: The Scheme and An
Appraisal, 122 NEw LAw J. 696 (1972); Zander, supra note 5. The major thrust of
the 1972 British legislation was directed toward expanding the number of people eligible
for legal aid by simplifying and liberalizing the financial eligibility standards which had
become so restrictive as to exclude over 90% of the population. Ginsburg, supra note 5.
In order to expand the scope of available services which had tended to be overbalanced
with divorce cases, the case screening arrangements of the old legal aid system were
dropped. However, gaps in the coverage still remain in many areas of laws such as
representation before tribunals in landlord-tenant cases. 124 NEw LAw J. 257 (1974);
118 SOL. J. 173 (1974).
13. Zander, supra note 5; 124 NEw LAw J. 257 (1974); 118 SOL. J. 173 (1974).
14. Segal, Representing the Poor: Developments in America, 124 NEw LAw J.
159 (1974); Zander, supra note 5. The British scene is, of course, complicated by the
traditional division of the legal profession into solicitors and barristers instead of the
American all purpose general practitioner.
15. Vann, Legal Costs and Expense Insurance, 124 NEw LAw J. 278 (1974).
The plan was introduced by insurance brokers Strover & Co. Ltd. and "is being under-
written by Lloyds, the masters of innovation." Id.
16. Brackel, supra note 8, at 113.
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Association (ABA) as a private bar association scheme to supplement
the OEO national legal services program on a more flexible and com-
prehensive basis than Judicare. The model chosen for the scheme
was the health insurance industry and the principle consumer of legal
services was to be the middle class. In the 1960's a study was con-
ducted on the feasibility of legal services insurance directed to people
over the poverty level but still too poor to pay standard legal fees out
of pocket. 7  The initial report was rather negative. Stolz, the re-
searcher, concluded that "[t]here is no direct evidence that the middle
class needs more legal service than it is presently getting."'"
Stolz further stated that the health insurance analogy was not ap-
plicable because the risk exposure was less, and legal costs were par-
tially covered by liability insurance and contingent fees for plaintiffs. 9
Unlike expensive hospitalization cases, the institutional costs in legal
proceedings were negligible compared to professional service fees.
Health insurance was built around the institutional costs of hospitaliza-
tion which were easier to assess and insure than professional services
fees.20  Finally, health insurance was the medical profession's re-
sponse to proposed "government sponsored compulsory health insur-
ance." Stolz did not feel that the legal profession was yet faced with
a comparable threat. 2'
Stolz also doubted that legal services for the middle class were
proper subjects for insurance treatment on economic grounds:
[T]he middle class apparently needs legal services that do not cost
very much and that are very widely distributed. Financing these
expenses through insurance will not reduce the cost to any indi-
vidual, indeed it will increase the total expense because of the cost
of administering the insurance program. 2 2
Nor was legal service insurance good social policy because it
would "encourage the use of lawyers in instances when the value of
the service is disproportionate to the value of the underlying claim.
'28
He concluded that "the primary value of legal insurance would be as
a way of encouraging people to use more legal services."24 Although
17. Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of the Feasibility,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1968).
18. Id. at 419.
19. Id. at 423.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 424. Stolz qualified his conclusion by noting that a sudden increase
in so-called "group legal services" could alter the situation. See discussion infra at 45.
22. Id. at 422.
23. ld. at 432.
24. ld. at 476.
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advantageous to the legal profession this could become socially waste-
ful if expensive legal services no longer "pay their own way," because
the claim was not economically worth the expense of litigating it. In
short, Stolz tended to confine civil justice to traditional property inter-
est concerns, limiting litigation to those transactions with sufficient as-
sets to pay their own legal expenses, which follows the second ap-
proach outlined at the beginning of this paper.
Stolz's skeptical view of the need for increased legal services for
the middle class was abandoned in later studies by Christensen.2 )
Christensen argued that there was a massive need for more legal serv-
ices among middle class people and that when the middle class dis-
covered that this need could be met, they would increase their demand
for legal services.
[A] largely untapped potential demand for lawyers' services simi-
larly exists among people of moderate means, awaiting only the
availability of services on acceptable terms to be translated into
an actual demand of substantial proportions .... 26
Although Christensen was primarily concerned with reducing the cost
of legal services through law office efficiency, specialization and the
use of paraprofessionals, 27 his arguments also added a more positive
note to the feasibility of prepaid legal service plans for the middle
class.
As Stolz's skeptical view of increased middle class need and de-
mand for lawyers was questioned by Christensen, his preceived
threat 28 to the private practice of law from so-called "group legal serv-
ices" picked up momentum. Group legal services means different
things to different people and at different points in time. Basically
it involves the delivery of legal services through a lay organization
either as a fringe or primary benefit of membership. The purpose
of the group is to provide access to lawyers and/or money for their
services. In ABA and local bar association literature,2 9 group legal
services refers to plans which limit participation to either salaried attor-
25. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MANs (1970); see also
Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1971).
26. Id. at 25. Christensen does not discuss whether the middle class is as yet
award of their need. See discussion of this issue infra at 54.
27. Id. at 44-56.
28. See supra note 21.
29. ABA SP. COMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, PRELIMINARY HANDBOOK ON
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES (1971); id., REVIsED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
(1972); an extensive bibliography of prepaid legal services and group legal services
materials can be found in Brickman, Legal Delivery Systems-A Bibliography, 4 UNIv.
TOLEDO L. REV. 465 (1973).
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ney employees of the sponsoring group or a selected list of private
attorneys chosen by the group. This is known in the literature as the
"closed panel."30  Prepaid legal services, by contrast, is known as the
"open panel" plan where all licensed attorneys are eligible to partici-
pate. The consumer chooses his private lawyer, and the prepaid plan
pays the lawyer's fee."
Group legal services (but not prepaid legal services) was consid-
ered unethical under the old ABA Cannons of Professional Ethics. 2
However in 1963, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a group
legal service plan operated by a civil rights organization to aid mem-
bers in civil rights litigation was protected by the first amendment
guarantees of free expression and association.3 3  The participating at-
torneys in this case were chosen by the Virginia NAACP Conference
and paid per diem fees. A year later the Supreme Court extended
first amendment protection to labor unions assisting their members to
retain lawyers in workmen's compensation cases. 34  This protection
30. 60 A.B.A.J. 369 (1974); Ellis, The Primrose Path for Lawyers, 36 UNAUTH-
ORIZED PRACTICE NEws, no. 3, at 1 (1972); ABA SP. COMM. ON PREPAm LEGAL SERV-
ICES, supra note 29.
31. See discussion in Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Pro-
cess, 48 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 595 (1973). Recent literature such as Morris, Group Pre-
paid Legal Services-An Insurance Viewpoint, 9 FORUM 163 (1973) tends to regard
group legal services as an alternative form of prepaid legal services. In such discussions,
the distinguishing characteristic of prepaid legal services is its insurance financing rather
than its method of choosing participating lawyers.
32. ABA CANNONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 35. For a history of attacks
on group legal services by the organized bar, see Riedmueller, Group Legal Services
and the Organized Bar, 10 COL. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 228 (1974).
33. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The NAACP argued on the basis
of "due process" and "equal protection" as well as the first amendment right of as-
sociation. The Court rejected the due process and equal protection arguments, but held
that the NAACP did have a protected right under the first amendment to "associate for
the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringement of their con-
stitutionally protected rights." Id. at 428. It should be noted that Button arose not as
an attempt on the part of Virginia to regulate group legal services, but as an attempt
"to penalize the NAACP because it promotes desegregation of the races." (Douglas, J.,
concurring) id. at 445; KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 75-90
(1965). It has been suggested that the existence of group legal services plans sponsored
by labor unions was first mentioned by the Court in Button as an attempt to neutralize
the racial issue. KALVEN, supra at 89-90.
34. Bhd. of Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court held that
the workman's compensation act was "authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic pub-
lic interest." Id. at 7. Thus the State of Virginia could "no more keep these workers
from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct
means to bar them from resoiting to courts to vindicate their legal rights." Id. at 7.
The Court upheld the model of group legal service plans sponsored by diverse organi-
zations for diverse purposes it had set up in Button despite the argument that "personal
injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for the set-
tlement of damage claims." (Clark, J., dissenting) id. at 10; see also Stolz, Sesame
Street for Lawyers: United Transportation Union v. The State Bar of Michigan, 36
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS No. 2, at 14 (1971).
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was later extended to unions which retained salaried attorneys for use
by their members35 and which set limits on the size of the fee which
their recommended attorneys could charge members.
3 6
Despite the urging of Christensen, Stolz, and others37 the ABA's
rewriting of the Cannon in 1969 as the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility sought to limit group legal service plans to non-profit organiza-
tions "to the extent that controlling constitutional intrepretation at the
time of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such
legal service activities. '38  Hostility to group legal services within the
ABA also resulted in restrictions on the purpose of organizations pro-
viding "constitutionally protected" legal services.3 9  In February 1974,
the Code was further amended to include group legal service plans
in areas not specifically covered by the Supreme Court decisions.40
However, plans sponsored by groups not under constitutional protec-
tion (i.e., other than civil rights groups and labor unions) must agree
to reimburse non-participating attorneys who may be selected by mem-
bers of the group 41 and to register with "the court or other authority
having final jurisdiction for the discipline of lawyers within the state."42
35. United Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). This case in-
volved workman's compensation claims under a state rather than a federal statute. The
Court rejected any distinction based on the federal nature of the claims to be litigated
in Bhd. of Trainmen, holding that first amendment rights related "to matters of local"
as well as "of federal concern." Id. at 227, n.7. The Court further rejected any
distinction between "political" activity (such as civil rights litigation in Button) and
other activities in the extension of first amendment protections. Id. at 233. See
generally ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTTUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1971).
36. United Transp. Union. v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971). It
should be emphasized that all three labor union decisions involved plans to assist mem-
bers in their individual workman's compensation claims, and not for legal representa-
tion in union business.
37. See, for example, Stolz, supra note 34.
38. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(5).
39. The "primary purposes" of the lay organization can not "include the rendi-
tion of legal services;" at the same time "the recommending, furnishing, or paying for
legal services" must be "reasonably related to the primary purpose" of the organiza-
tion. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(5)(b) & (c). If this appears to be confusing and
contradictory, it is because it is.
40. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsrIaLrrY, Disciplinary Rule 2-103(DX5)
(a)(ix) as reprinted in 60 A.B.A.J. 448 (1974).
41. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(5)(a)(v) as reprinted in 60 A.B.A.J. 448 (1974).
The point of a closed panel plan is that only the lawyers recommended by the sponsor-
ing group may participate in the plan. This provision allows any member of the group
to turn the plan into an open panel by selecting a lawyer not on the group's approved
panel. In other words, it requires that a closed panel plan become an open panel plan
whenever any member of the sponsoring group so desires. This is, of course, absurd.
Further, it is open to attack on both constitutional and antitrust grounds. See discus-
sion infra at 48-49, 63.
42. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(DX5)(a)(viii) as reprinted in 60 A.B.A.J. 448 (1974).
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There is reason to believe that such attempts by the organized
bar to forcibly prohibit group legal services on "closed panel" plans
on professional grounds are doomed to failure. The success union
sponsored group legal service plans have had in the United States Su-
preme Court has encouraged other types of organizations to experi-
ment with closed panel referral and insurance arrangements. The
state bar association of California, for example, reported over 192
group plans in existence in the state as of October 1971.' 3 Although
most of these plans were sponsored by labor unions, the California
Teacher's Association with 176,000 members, public employee as-
sociations with a total of 180,000 members, and smaller organizations
such as employee credit unions, small business associations, farm co-
operatives, college student associations, fraternal organizations, con-
sumer leagues and community-interest groups registered closed panel
plans. 44  There seems no reason to believe that the Supreme Court
would not uphold most of these if they were challenged by the organ-
ized bar.45
Despite the new ethical restrictions, the closed panel supporters
within the ABA have been gaining strength.46 Recent proposals in-
clude group legal services plans as possible mechanisms for the de-
livery of prepaid legal services.47 One particularly speculative theory
is presented by Brickman, in a recent article in the NEW YORK UNI-
VERSITY LAW REVIEW. 48 He traces universal access to "dispute-solv-
ing forums" back to a fifteenth century English statute.49 Access to
Several states have independently adopted registration requirements for group legal
services. Murphy, Group Legal Service Plans, 36 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTrCE NEws, no. 3,
at 7, 8 (1972). It is hoped this provision will encourage more states to adopt such
registration plans.
43. Murphy, supra note 42, at 7, 8. -California has had a registration requirement
for group legal service programs since 1970. Id. at 8; CALIF. ST. BAR ASS'N, RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, RULE 20. It is believed that only a fraction of the exist-
ing groups actually comply with the registration procedure. Id. at 7-8.
44. Murphy, supra note 42, at 8-9. One of the most publicized of these non-
union plans is the Berkeley Consumers Group Legal Service Plan described in Note:
Prepaid Legal Services and their Feasibility in Ohio, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 841, 848-49
(1972).
45. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Sym-
posium: Legal Services Delivery Systems for the 1970's, 4 UNrv. TOLEDO L. REV. 351
(1973); Brickman, supra note 31.
46. 60 A.B.A.J. 369 (1974).
47. Harris, Prepaid Legal Services Primer, 2 STUDENT LAWYER, no. 8, at 22
(1974); Morris, supra note 31; Ohio Prepaid Legal Services, supra note 44; Sympo-
sium, supra note 45; Brickman, supra note 31.
48. Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal
Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, supra note 31.
49. 2 Henry 7, c. 12 (1495).
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the judiciary in civil cases is such a basic right that it should be pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution as it is in crim-
inal cases. However, since this has not been recognized under due
process of equal protection, 0 it must be argued as an extension of
the first amendment, starting from the group legal service decisions.5 '
In order to buttress his argument, Brickman adds the assumption that
since access to the judiciary is meaningless without the assistance
of those skilled in the invocation of claims, lack of access to law-
yering services is equally damaging to our system of justice.
52
He believes that civil legal services can be analogized to the criminal
justice system because "[m]ost fundamentally, the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil cases on the basis of rights to liberty as op-
posed to property is specious.""
Brickman forsees an extension of the protected rights of groups
under such cases as Button, Board of Trainmen, United Mine Work-
ers and United Transportation Union to individuals. 4 In the absence
of such an extension, he discusses alternative plans to expand access
to courts such as legislation treating the bar as a public utility55 and
the removal of bar association restrictions setting minimum fees and
prohibiting advertising.5 6 He states that such bar association restric-
tions are products of a "litigation is evil" catechism, pointing out that
litigation has become a 'protected activity' which serves vital so-
cial functions and prohibitions which are an outgrowth of an out-
moded philosophy are equally antiquated and unresponsive to pres-
ent needs.5 7
On the practical level, Brickman falls into the same trap as neigh-
borhood law office enthusiasts.5" In attempting to support new deliv-
ery of legal services mechanisms through a constitutionally guaranteed
50. The fundamental interest (in divorce cases) protected by Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (court costs in divorce cases a violation of due process) was
successfully circumvented by U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (court costs upheld
in bankruptcy cases, because no fundamental interest was involved). Brickman, supra
note 31, at 597.
51. I.e., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bhd. of Trainmen v. Va. State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
52. Brickman, supra note 31, at 597.
53. Id. at 623. The analogy weakens his first amendment argument because the
right to counsel in criminal cases has been extended under due process, not the first
amendment. See, for example, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. Brickman, supra note 31, at 629-36.
55. Id. at 626-29.
56. Id. at 641-49.
57. Id. at 646-47.
58. Bowler, supra note 1.
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universal right of access to courts and "lawyering services," he will only
succeed in generating still more popular demand for legal services
which cannot be met. He will increase America's already over ex-
tended propensity for litigation59 by contributing to the current Rights
and Grievances Explosions. The more he increases demand for law-
yers, the more difficult it becomes for his new delivery of legal service
mechanisms to meet this demand, and the less chance they have of
being successful. In short, Brickman is engaged in promoting the new
delivery of legal service mechanisms in a manner which exacerbates
the very problems they were designed to solve.
A potentially more disruptive threat to the organized bar is shap-
ing up in congressional activities and antitrust litigation. The con-
sumer movement and Senator John V. Tunney's Subcommittee on the
Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary have launched a full scale attack on the present attitudes of
attorneys in dealing with the small consumer of legal services.6" The
first target was not group legal service restrictions, but minimum fee
schedules, a long time bar association device to keep attorneys from
offering cut-rate fees for legal services. The minimum fee schedule
was successfully challenged as a price fixing device by a private anti-
trust suit last year.61 In the face of threats of future antitrust actions,
the ABA has retreated from its previous support of minimum fee
schedules and a number of state bar associations have dropped them.62
Despite the attempted change in policy of the organized bar, a civil
antitrust suit was recently filed by the Justice Department in Portland,
Oregon.
63
The monopolistic character of group legal service restrictions is
only slightly less apparent than minimum fee schedules. Spurred on
by consumer groups and Senator Tunney, the Justice Department is
presently threatening antitrust action against the ABA for its attempt
59. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1969); Stolz, supra
note 17; see also Zashin, Civil Rights and Civil Disobedience: The Limits of Legalism,
52 TEX. L. REv. 285 (1974).
60. Fellers, The Challenges of Supplying Legal Services, 60 A.B.A.J. 43 (1974);
Green, Challenging the Bar, Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
61. Goldfarb v. Virginia St. Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973). The district
court held that minimum fee schedules are a form of price-fixing and inconsistent with
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The case is presently on appeal in the U.S. court of ap-
peals. See Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 TULANE
L. REv. 682 (1974).
62. ABA and Justice Dep't Explain Positions on Minimum Fee Schedules to Sen-
ate Subcommittee, 59 A.B.A.J. 1296, 1299 (1973).
63. Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1974, at 4.
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to restrict group legal service plans through professional sanctions, as
discussed above. 64  Attacks on other monopolistic practices enshrined
in the legal ethics system are sure to follow. It is much too early to
speculate on the potential effect of antitrust litigation against the tradi-
tional organization of the legal profession. Even if unsuccessful, the
echoes of antitrust activities against one of America's largest profes-
sional monopolies is bound to lend support to those within the ABA
calling for a more flexible policy towards reforms in the delivery of
legal services.
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES: THE REALITY
In January 1971 a legal costs insurance plan went into operation
in Louisiana under the title "Shreveport Prepaid Legal Service Plan."
This program, administered by the Shreveport Bar Association (with
assistance of the ABA) and Local 229 of the Laborers International
Union of North America, was guaranteed by the Ford Foundation as
an experimental open panel prepaid legal service plan.65  An exten-
sive American Bar Foundation report concluded that it was basically
successful from -the point of view of both the members of the Shreveport
Bar Association and the members of Local 229.66 The American Bar
Foundation study of the Shreveport plan has not been without criti-
cism.67 The primary objection is the same argument which applies
to the American Judicare programs,68 the participating group is too
small and too isolated from the mainstream of American culture to
be representative. 69 The researchers admit that "the Shreveport ex-
periment is an inadequate base upon which to form final judgments
about the utility of a specific legal delivery system. ' 70  Nevertheless,
64. Id.; Chicago Sun Times, May 15, 1974, at 48; Chicago Tribune, May 17, 1974,
at 1. Antitrust can be a doubled edged sword. The ABA could concievably argue that
closed panel plans are monopolistic practices vis-a-vis the non-participating members
of the bar.
65. MARKS, HALLAUER, & CLIFFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT
IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 1-7 (1974); see also Hallauer Shreveport Experi-
ment in Prepaid Legal Services, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 223 (1973); Roberts, Shreveport
Plan for Prepaid Legal Services-A Unique Experiment, 32 LA. L. REV. 45 (1971).
66. MARKS, HALLAUER & CLIFFTON, supra note 65, at 93-95. The American
Bar Foundation is the research wing of the ABA.
67. See Getman, A Critique of the American Bar Foundation's Shreveport Study,
3 J. LEGAL STUDiEs-(1974).
68. See discussion supra at 41-43.
69. The 583 members of Local 299 were almost all black, male, married and had
a median and mean age of about 50. MARKS, HALLAUER & CLIFFTON, supra note 65,
at 20. The Judicare programs served small numbers of rural whites and Indians in
northern Wisconsin and Montana.
70. MARKS, HALLAUER & CLIFFTON, supra note 65, at 95.
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they feel that the Shreveport experiment provides sufficient evidence
that "the legal insurance concept works.
'71
Observers outside the ABA are more cautious about the future
of both open and closed panel plans. 72  A few difficult legal problems
remain in the path of both types of plans. One of these was solved
in August 1973 when Congress amended the Taft-Hartley Act to in-
clude union group legal service plans as a proper subject for collective
bargaining. 73 For the first time since the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947, employer contributions to legal service plans for their
employees can be held in jointly administered trust funds. 74  Another
problem involves tax deductibility of employer contributions, taxability
to the employee and taxation of the fund. 75 The ABA is currently lob-
bying for an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code which would
prevent employer contributions to legal service plans from being taxed
to the employee.
70
A more difficult legal problem concerns control over prepaid le-
gal service plans. The ABA envisions bar association initiative and con-
trol over both open and closed panel plans. Their pilot plan in
Shreveport was controlled by the bar, the new amendments to the
Code of Professional Responsibility provide for registration of group
legal service plans with the state bar,77 and ABA sponsored literature
on the topic calls for programs planned and promoted by local bar as-
sociations.78  The insurance industry, however, looks to the analogy
71. Id.
72. Haneberg, Group Legal Services-The "Fringe" of the Future?, 112 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 266 (1973); Green, Labor Union Group Legal Service for Member, 18
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 39 (1969).
73. Pub. L. 93-95, amending § 302(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947. Pub. L. 93-95 excludes employment practices, grievances and disputes with the
sponsoring union from coverage under the legal service plans. Both of these areas are
potential sources of substantial blue collar legal problems.
74. The open panel vs. closed panel spilled over into Congress where the House
sought to limit approval to open panel plans, despite the fact that most union plans are
closed panel. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT TRUST FUNDS
FOR LEGAL SERVICES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print, January 1974). The final
act, however, provides for a "trust fund established ...for the purpose of defraying
the costs of legal services for employees ... for counsel or plan of their choice."
Pub. L. 93-95 (emphasis added). This means the union members can choose a closed
panel plan if they so desire.
75. Haneberg, supra note 72, at 268; Ohio Prepaid Legal Services, supra note 44,
at 874.
76. Ohio Prepaid Legal Services, supra note 44, at 874.
77. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-103(DX5)(a)
(viii).
78. Symposium, supra note 45; Bibliography id. at 465; Ohio Prepaid Legal Serv-
ices, supra note 44; ABA Sp. COMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 29.
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with health insurance, and is speculating about state regulation of pre-
paid and group legal service plans under insurance statutes. 79  In
Ohio, the state bar association is attempting to circumvent regulation
of its prepaid legal services plan under the state insurance statute by
establishing a "trust fund" with contributions from participating attor-
neys in the Ohio Bar Association.80
Suggestions have also been made to establish state agencies out-
side both the organized bar and insurance departments to control legal
service plans.81 Not all private insurance schemes are in competition
with the organized bar, 2 but
past experience suggests that unions in particular and perhaps the
other interested parties involved directly or indirectly are not
about to have programs dictated to them by those whose services
will be utilized.8 3
A final problem of prepaid legal service plans is that almost all
of the literature is written by the promoters or potential promoters of
such plans. There is almost nothing written by the proposed recipients
of these services. This is significant because as the insurance lawyers
point out "the biggest unanswered question . . . is whether the aver-
age worker wants or needs prepaid group legal services."84
Christensen's studies 5 appeared to demonstrate a middle class
need for more legal services based on the frustrations of increased con-
tact with judicial tribunals brought about by the growing complexities
of personal transactions in the twentieth century world. These in-
79. Haneberg, supra note 72; Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services-For Whose Bene-
fit?, 46 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 167 (1974); Ohio Prepaid Legal Services, supra note 44, at
886; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1972, at 24.
80. Jetter, Prepaid Legal Services: The Ohio Experience, 41 INSURANCE COUNSEL
J. 50 (1974); Ohio Prepaid Legal Services, supra note 44, at 886; Hoffman & Finger-
man, Prepaid Legal Services-A 'Hospitalization' Plan for the Law, 1 CINN. BAR Ass'N
J. 6 (1974). The program is still in the planning stages and appears to be a small scale
experimental project.
81. Cole, An Act to Regulate Group Legal Service Plans, 11 HAv. J. LEo. 68
(1973). Cole's model legislation suffers from acute confusion over the subject mat-
ter of his regulations. At one point he resorts to defining a "nonidentified group legal
service plan." Id. at 82. The metaphysics which would be involved in regulating a
"nonidentified plan" is mind boggling.
82. The Insurance Company of North America, for example, is presently planning
a jointly sponsored "pilot plan" with the Philadelphia Bar Association. Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 6, 1972, at 24; THE NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 12, 1974, at 14 (Life &
Health Ins. Ed.).
83. Haneberg, supra note 72, at 268.
84. Id.
85. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 25.
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creased contacts are already straining the functional capacity of the tra-
ditional judicial system. 6 If prepaid legal insurance were to succeed,
this contact must continue to increase until the risk of litigation ex-
penses to each insured member is substantial enough to justify the in-
surance.8 7  If Stolz's analysis is correct, the risk is presently too low
for legal services insurance to be successful. However, it is question-
able that the judicial system can survive the increase in regular use
of legal services necessary for the success of the insurance. In other
words, the present mechanism for the delivery of judicial services may
collapse long before the prepaid legal services promoters can drum
up enough demand for legal services to insure the success of their new
delivery of legal services mechanisms.
Christensen's book 88 rested on the further assumption that be-
cause the middle class had a need for increased legal services, they
were aware of that need and were simply waiting for a system of de-
livering legal services at prices they could afford. This assumption
may prove to be unwarranted.89 It can be shown that OEO neighbor-
hood offices were inundated by demands for lawyers' services," and
that the civil rights and anti-poverty movements resulted in an explo-
sion of new Rights and Grievances to be litigated."' However, the
fact that litigation has become the popular means of attacking social
and economic problems and that minority groups are proliferating legal
Rights and Grievances to be asserted by their attorneys, does not mean
that the middle class is ready to jump at the chance to buy traditional
individual and family legal services. To put it another way, the citizen
who now files a complaint about job discrimination, writes to Ralph
Nader about his consumer problems and joins the Sierra Club, is not
necessarily ready to purchase insurance against -the costs of writing his
will and divorcing his spouse.
Ultimately the delivery of service approach fails to consider ex-
actly what kind of services are being delivered and whether the pro-
86. Carrington, supra note 59.
87. Stolz, supra note 17, at 423.
88. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 25.
89. An inquiry into the feasibility of establishing a legal insurance plan in Ohio
lists "the Public" as the first "obstacle to prepaid plans." Ohio Prepaid Legal Ser-
vices, supra note 44, at 848. "The public must be educated respecting the law and the
services that lawyers can effectively and appropriately perform." Id.
90. See Bowler, supra note 1.
91. Carrington, supra note 59; see also Zashin, supra note 59; Bowler, supra note
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posed consumer of the services really wants them to be delivered at
all. It is quite possible the middle class will look on prepaid legal
service plans in the same cynical fashion as a local New York bar as-
sociation commentator:
Were pre-paid [legal services] to come law in this state...
the legal profession could expect the same tremendous influx of
income as the medical profession experienced after the adoption
of pre-paid medical insurance.1
2
In short, is prepaid legal services the answer to the problems of mod-
erate income clients or not so moderate income lawyers?
THE ALTERNATIVE PRACTICE OF LAW93
While the ABA is caught up in new mechanisms for the delivery
of legal services, other trends within the legal profession are moving
toward the development of new, more generally accessible legal insti-
tutions, 4 and a return to the traditional use of the political process
to solve the social and economic problems which have been spilling
over into the courts in the past decade.95 One of these trends is the
increase in pro bono publico work in some of the large law firms. Pro
bono publico (for the good of the public) is a traditional term for char-
ity work done by established law firms in order to promote their pub-
lic image.90 It could conceivably include Judicare, with its below aver-
age level of remuneration.9 7  In the absence of Judicare plans in ur-
ban areas where the large firms are situated, pro bono publico experi-
ments are usually directed to indigents, or to so-called "public inter-
est" work.9" More ambitious firms have subsidized branch offices on
the model of the OEO neighborhood law office.99
The pro bono publico approach is most suitable for large, well-
capitalized, prestigious law firms. It is significant because of the re-
cent increases in the percentage of lawyers turning to large firm as
92. Lubitz, On the Horizon: Prepaid Legal Services, 21 ADVOCATE 55 (1974).
93. The phrase was taken from a seminar sponsored by the National Lawyers'
Guild at Northwestern University, April 20, 1974. Although the Lawyers' Guild used
the phrase to refer to politically "radical" lawyers, the author believes it is a useful
description of a number of new developments in the practice of law generally.
94. See discussion supra at 41.
95. See discussion supra at 41.
96. MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 8
(1972).
97. "mit has been used to designate work for which the lawyer is not paid or paid
at a rate lower than a lawyer. . . applying the term customarily receives." Id.
98. See discussion of "public interest" law, infra at 59.
99. See for example, ASHMAN, THE NEW PRIVATE PRACTICE: A STUDY OF PIPER
& MARBuRY's NEIGHBORHOOD LAW OFFICE (1972).
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opposed to small firm or solo practice of law. 100 Many of these
younger lawyers have social consciences which need a new outlet. Al-
though often described as the development of a new legal services in-
stitution, 101 the actual effect of pro bono publico work on the public
has been small and mainly along traditional lines of volunteer charity
work by the legal profession.
10 2
Politically radical lawyers were described in connection with the
OEO legal services program in a previous article.' Radical lawyers
were traditionally associated with civil libertarian litigation, especially
first amendment cases. Their most recent successors, however, are
gravitating into marginally successful private practice arrangements
representing aspiring radical political groups. 04 Curiously, although
purportedly committed to the development of new legal institutions for
"the people," many young radical lawyers are drifting into more tradi-
tional practice, on the model of the small partnership or solo practi-
tioner. The scope of their litigation is turning to "bread and butter"
legal services designed to insure their economic survival, leaving the
transformation of society to their outside political activities.105 This
development is also an interesting counter trend to the current move-
ment of young attorneys into salaried positions with large firms. The
independent small practitioner may not become an extinct species after
all. 106
On the forefront of trends towards the development of legal insti-
100. Large firms traditionally hire law school graduates as salaried "associates"
and submit them to a long and intensive apprenticeship. Those who do well may ulti-
mately be admitted to the controlling partnership. A recent study claims that the per-
centage of "associates" within the legal profession from 1948 to 1970 has increased
from 4% to 8% generally and in urban areas has gone from 6% to 10%. The per-
centage of solo practitioners, on the other hand, has declined from 61% of the profes-
sion in 1948 to 37% in 1970. York & Hale, Too Many Lawyers?, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 1,
7, 12 (1974).
101. For example, THE NEW PRVATE PRACTICE, supra note 99.
102. See generally MARKs, supra note 96.
103. Bowler, supra note 1, at 421-23.
104. See description of the "group representative" in Bowler, supra note 1, at
422-23. Disaffected radical OEO attorneys have been attempting to continue this type of
practice on a self-financing basis, often with the aid of a spouse employed in a better
paying occupation. Panel discussion at seminar described supra note 93.
105. Id.
106. There are two current sourcebooks on the activities of radical lawyers in
America: GINGER, THE RELEVANT LAWYERS (1972); and JAMES, THE PEOPLE'S LAwYERS
(1973). Both are based on oral interviews. James' description of trends among radical
lawyers was confirmed on the local level by the discussion at the seminar described
supra note 93. The key speaker, Pearl Hart, was a civil libertarian. The young practi-
tioners were either operating on the "group representative" model or drifting into small
firm general practice of law.
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tutions more accessible to the general public are the class action and
the public interest cases. Class actions and public interest cases are
procedural approaches to litigation which do not necessarily alter the
traditional organization of the legal profession or the class of people
served. However, a brief discussion of these devices is included be-
cause of their potential for transforming the entire problem of access
to legal remedies for perceived injustices to the lower and middle
classes.
Class actions and public interest cases arose out of the interaction
between suits concerning certain private property rights and those in-
volving public law. The class action was originally a procedural device
whereby one or more individuals sued on behalf of a numerous class
of individuals similarly situated where it was impractical to join all
members of the class as parties to the action. 10 7  Current interest in
class actions arose after the federal court system adopted new Rule
23 which established a specific list of requirements for class actions
in federal courts.'08 Rule 23 applys to private actions under general
federal jurisdiction, 0 9 jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizen-
ship" and provision by federal statute."' Actions under general and
diversity jurisdiction require a minimum jurisdictional amount of
$10,000. In Snyder v. Harris"2 the Supreme Court held that the
claims of members of the class can not be aggregated to meet the juris-
diction amount. This restriction was later extended in Zahn v. Inter-
national Paper Co."13 where the court held that each member of the
class, whether or not present in court, must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount. Since most class actions are based on numerous small claims,
these decisions have effectively limited class actions to statutory actions
where no jurisdictional amount is required." 4
107. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of Amer-
ca, 23 BUFFALO LAW REV. 343, 348 (1974); see also CLASS ACTIONS PRIMER (Fuchs-
berg ed. 1973).
108. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 23 (effective July 1, 1966). The new rule was designed to
expedite class actions in federal courts.
109. 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1970).
110. 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1970).
111. Primarily private anti-trust actions under the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15
(1970); and actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Note, Managing
the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Eisen Note]; CLASS AcToNS PRIMER, supra note 107, at 41, 63.
112. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
113. 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
114. Eisen Note, supra note 111, at 426-27. It should be noted that this decision
could be changed by Congressional action expanding federal jurisdiction over small
claims in class actions. There is a movement in this direction in the Senate. 120
CONG. Rac. S. 855 (Jan. 31, 1974).
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An even more basic problem is the issue of managibility of ex-
tremely large class actions with many small claims. In the recent Su-
preme Court decision Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin the class con-
sisted of more than 6 million purchasers of odd lot shares on the New
York Stock Exchange in 1962 to 1966."1 The issue was not so much
proof of the defendant's wrongdoing but the administration of a judg-
ment effecting so many often unidentifiable plaintiffs." 6  The Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff had the responsibility of individ-
ually notifying all members of the class who could be identified with
reasonable effort. Inasmuch as the plaintiff in question had stated that
he was unwilling to undertake this expense, the Court was able to dis-
pose of the case without passing on the fluid class recovery scheme
proposed by a lower court to administer -the damage claims.
This very complicated and expensive litigation had all been un-
dertaken by a named plaintiff who had a statutory claim for treble
damages of $2101"7 (the action was brought under the Securities
Exchange Act which requires no jurisdictional amount). But al-
though each individual claim was small, the private law action brought
to light a massive violation of the Securities Exchange Act which cost
over 6 million people more than $65 million." 8  At this point, the
strictly private law action expanded into a matter of public concern." 9
It is through such actions that the consumer's movement hopes to as-
sert the very real grievances of large segments of the public in areas
where large business concerns have engaged in small violations of gov-
ernment regulations on a massive scale. Unfortunately, present limita-
tions on aggregation to meet the jurisdictional amount, the burden of
notice requirements and the uncertainty of the manageability issue in
statutory actions such as Eisen have temporarily halted further devel-
opments in class action litigation.
Class actions, if allowed to continue to represent plaintiffs with
115. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386
U.S. 1035 (1967), rev'd and remanded 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearings 50
F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 54 F.R.D. 565
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.) (dismissed as class action), aff'd
42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). The basic issue in Eisen involved a dam-
age payment scheme known as "fluid class recovery." See discussion in Eisen Note,
supra note 111; Homberger, supra note 107, at 345, 371-73; CLASS AcTIoNs PRIMER,
supra note 107, at 147-59. However, the dispositive issue before the Supreme Court
was notice to the members of the plaintiff "class."
116. Homberger, supra note 107, at 345; CLAss ActnoNs PRIMER, supra note 107,
at 147-59; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119, Id. t 345-46,
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small claims, could provide another outlet for the Rights and Griev-
ances Explosion. It is very possible that the current popular insistence
on abstract personal Rights is not the result of a few big abstract Griev-
ances, but the accumulation of many small concrete Grievances. The
consumer's movement may be correct in asserting that a remedy for
small injuries systematically imposed on large numbers of people, can
alleviate the frustration and feeling of powerlessness of the middle and
lower classes. On the other hand, an admission by the institutions of
civil justice that laws do not apply to those who cheat large numbers
of people if they keep the injury to each individual small enough is
dangerous to the integrity of the entire legal system.
Public interest actions are concerned with the enforcement of
rights vested in the general public or a segment thereof.11' They
traditionally challenge "alleged unconstitutional or illegal exercise of
power by the political branches of government."'' The current round
of public interest cases was begun by F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station 22 dealing with broadcast regulations. Other examples of pub-
lic interest cases are first amendment'23 and environmental cases.1
24
The problem here is standing to sue. The theory behind public
interest suits is that the plaintiff acts as a "private attorney general."
However, under Sierra Club v. Morton the private attorney general
is now required to prove that he, personally, was injured by the action
which is the subject of the suit.' 25 On the one hand, the private class
action case is being restricted because it deals with private property
interests even though the scope and number of people involved bring
it into the sphere of general public concern. But on the other hand,
the public interest case is limited to plaintiffs who can show a private in-
terest (albeit the interest need not be economic) in -the suit, thereby
120. Id. at 387. As opposed to the private property concerns of straight class
actions. See Presser, Public Interest Litigation in the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit: A Current Perspective, 41 GEO. WASHINGTON L. Rnv. 260 (1972) for an
analysis of the subject matter of public interest cases brought in the D.C. Circuit from
March 30, 1970 to June 30, 1972.
121. Homburger, supra note 107. For a discussion of the evolution of federal
public interest law, see id. at 388-95.
122. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The Court granted standing to a radio station to ap-
peal an F.C.C. decision in the absence of property interest in order to sustain the public
interest in radio service. See Homberger, supra note 107, at 386.
123. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayers suit on aid to religious
schools).
124. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Court denied standing
to the Sierra Club to challenge the conversion of a game preserve into a privately op-
erated resort.
125. Id. at 398-403.
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bringing it closer to the private class action. In short, further develop-
ment in this area, either by the Supreme Court or through congres-
sional legislation, is needed before the federal class action and public
interest case can become a viable vehicle for consolidating and im-
plementing large scale claims and grievances.
CONCLUSION
We have seen three different approaches of the private legal pro-
fession to the problems of increased demand for lawyers and the
Rights and Grievances Explosions discovered by and possibly created
by the OEO legal services program. The area of greatest potential,
the development of new "peoples" legal institutions, appears to be im-
mobilized by the current uncertainties regarding class actions and pub-
lic interest law on the federal level. A minor renaissance of pro se
representation in small claims courts is attracting some interest.12 6 To
the extent that small claims courts can provide an outlet for the Rights
and Grievance Explosions, it is a healthy sign. However, small claims
courts in the United States are hardly a new legal institution. 27 Their
limitation is that they are only equipped to deal with small scale, tan-
gible property disputes. Experience indicates that, in their present
form, they may provide some measure of satisfaction for small property
owners with litigious designs on their neighbor's property, while push-
ing larger social and economic problems back into the political proc-
ess.
Like the small claims court, the second approach holds that civil
justice is and should be primarily concerned with property rights and
that massive social and economic problems can be better dealt with
in the political process. This seems to be the conclusion of politically
radical lawyers who were disillusioned by the failure of the OEO legal
services to initiate any large scale social revolution. It also is the view
of Senator Tunney's supporters 2 ' and the sponsors of the proposed
Consumer's Protection Agency.29 In a backhanded way, it appears
126. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER
GRIEVANCES (1973); S. 2928, "A bill to establish national goals for the effective, fair,
inexpensive, and expeditious resolution of controversies involving consumers ....
127. The small claims court movement in the United States began in 1913. NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 13.
128. See supra note 60.
129. S. 707; SENATE REPORT 93-792, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). This bill is the
political process' (i.e., Congress') answer to the consumer movement. It would estab-
lish a federal consumer advocacy agency to aid consumers without any regulatory liti-
gation initiating powers. A similar bill, H.R. 13163, was passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives, April 3, 1974, 120 CONG, REC. H.2517-2564.
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to be the view of the Justice Department in attacking the organized
bar on antitrust grounds at the very moment it is attempting to mobilize
a large scale delivery of legal services program to meet a perceived
need on the part of the middle and lower classes for better access to
legal services.
Finally, the third approach is the development of a new system
for delivering more legal services to meet the increased demand. The
ABA is presently in the forefront in this area with its prepaid legal
services insurance scheme. This scheme is clearly of economic benefit
to the organized bar. However, it is inflationary 3 ° and potentially bad
for the general economy. It promises to further overburden an al-
ready overloaded court system. Finally, it does not address itself to
the social and economic problems which gave rise to the present de-
mand for legal services.
History being a cyclical development, the future is probably in
the hands of the second approach which would retreat to more tradi-
tional roles for institutions of civil justice. However, one can not help
but be attracted by the potential for new legal institutions on the
American scene, as one gains an understanding of the complexity of
the relationship between civil justice and the social problems these
new legal institutions represent.
130. Current observers believe that the large scale purchase of health insurance
by corporations for their employees is a major factor in the rapidly escalating costs of
health care in the United States. Proposals have been made for scrapping the health
insurance approach in favor of more efficient and economic private programs as well
as government health care. See for example, Platou & Rice, Multihospital Holding
Companies, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. May-June, 1972, at 14; Ellwood & Herbert, Health
Care: Should Industry Buy It or Sell It?, 51 HAiv. Bus. RPv. July-Aug., 1973, at 99.
Prepaid legal insurance supporters should also note that health insurance plans have
not solved the problem of delivering health care services in the United States.
